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INFORMED CONSENT AND THE MENTAL PATIENT:
CALIFORNIA RECOGNIZES A MENTAL PATIENT'S
RIGHT TO REFUSE PSYCHOSURGERY AND SHOCK
TREATMENT
The processes of life, the make-up of the human organism,
who can fully understand these miracles? ... What is happen-
ing to you now is what should happen to any normal healthy
human organism contemplating the actions of the forces of
evil, the working of the principle of destruction. You are
being made sane, you are being made healthy.'
I. INTRODUCTION
While great attention has been focused over the past twenty
years on protecting the rights of previously neglected groups such
as criminal suspects,2 black schoolchildren,' juvenile offenders4
and consumers,5 courts and legislatures are just beginning to
recognize the basic constitutional and procedural rights of the
mentally ill.6 One right that is now being extended to mental pa-
tients is the right to refuse treatment.7 Unlike other medical prac-
titioners, psychiatrists have long possessed the legal power to force
treatment on institutionalized mental patients.8 Some of the more
drastic forms of treatment which have been used on mental pa-
tients without their consent include psychosurgery and shock
treatment. Psychosurgery is the removal or destruction of healthy
brain tissue for the purpose of affecting behavior.0  Shock treat-
1. A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE 110 (2d ed. 1972).
2. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Baxtrom v. Herald,
383 U.S. 107 (1966).
7. R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 243 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as SLOVENKO]. See Mich. Stats. (1974), P.A. 258, § 716, at 638 (West Legisla-
tive Service 1974), amending MICH. COMP. LAWS ANNOT. § 330.1716. For an
analysis of Congressional activity and recently issued executive guidelines on the
use of psychosurgery, see Spoonhour, Psychosurgery and Informed Consent, 26
U. FLA. L. REv. 432, 449-50 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Spoonhour].
8. SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 243.
9. Id. at 248. It is estimated that some 500 psychosurgical operations are
performed annually in the United States. Offir, Psychosurgery and the Law-
The Movement to Pull Out the Electrodes, 7 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May, 1974, at
69.
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ment is the use of drugs, hormones, or electric shock to induce
convulsions in patients as a means of treating certain mental dis-
orders.10
In response to the need for regulating the use of dangerous
and controversial treatments on patients without their consent, the
California legislature adopted AB 4481 on September 27, 1974."
The new law, which became effective on January 1, 1975, pro-
vides that mental patients have the right to choose whether to sub-
mit to psychosurgery or shock treatment in California mental insti-
tutions., 2
The bill has been criticized by some members of the medi-
cal community as an unwarranted intrusion on the psychiatrist's
right to determine the most appropriate treatment for a pa-
tient." Supporters of the bill consider it a major breakthrough
in the recognition of basic civil rights for mental patients.' 4 As
a result of the controversy over AB 4481, the use of psychosurgery
and shock treatment has been suspended at various hospitals,'
a law suit has been instituted to enjoin enforcement of the new
consent law,' 6 and an emotional public debate over the value of
10. Krouner, Shock Therapy and Psychiatric Malpractice: The Legal Accom-
odation to a Controversial Procedure, J. FOR. MED. 397, 398 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Krouner]. The number of shock treatments administered annually
in California is hard to determine because no statewide records are kept. How-
ever, one hospital in San Francisco alone conducted over 1000 electro-shock treat-
ments in 1974. Letter from Orville Booth, Executive Vice-President, Saint Fran-
cis Memorial Hospital, to the San Francisco Mental Health Advisory Board, Jan.
17, 1975 [on file with SANTA CLARA LAWYER].
11. Cal. Stats. (1974), ch. 1534, at 4328 (West Legislative Service).
12. Id. at 4328.
13. Margolis, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1974, at 44, col. 2 (letter
to the editor).
14. Statement by Wade Hudson, member of Network Against Psychiatric As-
sault, before the San Francisco Mental Health Advisory Board, Jan. 20, 1975, at
4 [on file with SANTA CLARA LAWYER] [hereinafter cited as Hudson Statement].
15. Letter from Richard H. Trapnell, Chairman, 'Psychiatric Committee at
Saint Francis Memorial Hospital, to all members of the medical staff, Nov. 21,
1974, [on file with SANTA CLARA LAWYER] [hereinafter cited as Trapnell letter].
16. Doe v. Younger, Civil No. 361769 (San Diego County Super. Ct., filed
Dec. 30, 1974). Doe was filed by two physicians and a mental patient receiving
shock treatment, who are seeking to enjoin enforcement of AB 4481 on a variety
of grounds. The complainants have alleged, inter alia, that:
1) the establishment of a committee to review all shock treatment and
psychosurgery proposals as required under AB 4481 constitutes an in-
vasion of a patient's right to privacy (Doe complaint at 5);
2) such reviews impinge on patient-physician confidentiality (ld.);
3) provisions of AB 4481 which allow governmental officials to review
patient records violate a patient's right to privacy (Id. at 3);
4) the harsh penalty provisions of the bill are vague and unconstitu-
tionally discriminate against psychiatrists and neurosurgeons (ld. at
7).
A temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of AB 4481 was
issued by Judge Charles W. Froehlich of the San Diego Superior Court on De-
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these treatments has surfaced. 17
AB 4481 makes three significant changes in current Califor-
nia law. First, the word "lobotomy" is deleted from section 5325
of the Welfare and Institutions Code and replaced by the word
"psychosurgery."' 8  In addition to offering a definition of psycho-
surgery, the bill recognizes the absolute right of mental patients
to refuse such treatment.19 Second, AB 4481 guarantees a pa-
tient who is deemed capable of giving informed consent the right
to refuse shock treatment.2" Prior to AB 4481, California law
permitted the director of a mental facility to authorize shock treat-
ment, in spite of a patient's objections, upon a showing of good
cause.2' Under the new law, a patient's refusal to submit to shock
treatment must be respected.22 Third, the statute provides that
a physician who violates it may be fined up to $10,000 and have
his license to practive medicine revoked. 3
This comment will examine AB 4481 by first considering the
concept of informed consent and its usual application in the prac-
tice of medicine. The analysis will then focus upon the concept of
informed consent as applied by AB 4481 to the treatment of mental
illness. Turning next to a discussion of psychosurgery and its his-
torical development as a means of modifying human behavior, the
comment will examine closely the provisions of AB 4481 which
require mental institutions to obtain informed consent before
psychosurgery is performed. In the discussion of psychosurgery,
the comment will undertake an analysis of a recent Michigan Cir-
cuit Court decision, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health,24
the only case thus far which has dealt with the issue of informed
consent to psychosurgery. Kaimowitz is significant because it
recognizes that the inherently coercive environment of the mental
cember 30, 1974. Petitioners have filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the
Fourth District Court of Appeals (Civil No. 4-14407).
17. Psychiatry Is No Legislative Area, Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle,
Feb. 26, 1975, at 44, col. 1; San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 21, 1975, at 3, col.
1; San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Jan. 19, 1975, § A, at 4, col.
1; The Daily California, July 15, 1974, at 3, col. 1; TIME, Jan. 20, 1975, at 56,
col. 3.
18. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325(g) (West Supp. 1975).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 5326.4(g).
21. Id. § 5326 (West 1972), as amended, Cal. Stats. (1974), ch. 1534, at
4329.
22. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326.4(g) (West Supp. 1975).
23. Id. § 5326.5(a).
24. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10,
1973). Kaimowitz is extensively discussed in Spoonhour, supra note 7, and Com-
ment, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: A Right to be Free From
Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U.L. REV. 301 (1974).
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institution precludes a patient who has been confined for a sub-
stantial period of time from rendering informed consent.
Next, the comment will outline the history and nature of
shock treatment, with consideration given to AB 4481's require-
ment that informed consent be obtained prior to the administration
of shock treatment. Finally, the comment will examine the new
law's third party consent requirements with regard to shock treat-
ment.
AB 4481 requires that a determination of a patient's capacity
to consent be made before either psychosurgery or shock treat-
ment is administered. 5 Since it is commonly assumed that per-
sons undergoing treatment for mental illness are somehow incap-
able of exercising the judgment necessary to render informed con-
sent, the question of a mental patient's capacity to consent is cru-
cial in analyzing the new statute. Both the law and modem
psychiatric practice recognize that mental incompetence and men-
tal illness are entirely separate concepts.2 Unless found to be
incompetent by a court of law, the mental patient should retain
the right to consent to such dangerous and controversial forms of
treatment.
Determining mental competency has traditionally been re-
served to the courts and the legal system.27 AB 4481, however,
breaks with this tradition and allows a reviewing committee, com-
posed of physicians, to judge whether a mental patient has the
necessary mental capacity to make an informed consent to either
form of treatment covered by the law.2" It is the thesis of this
comment that such a critical and-in the case of psychosurgery-
25. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5326.3(e), 5326.4(e) (West Supp. 1975).
26. See id. § 5331, which states:
[n]o person may be presumed to be incompetent because he or she has
been evaluated or treated for mental disorder....
In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), the court noted:
a finding of mental illness, even by a judge or jury, does not raise even
a presumption that a patient is "incompetent" or unable adequately to
manage his own affairs. Absent a specific finding of incompetence, the
mental patient retains the right to sue or defend in his own name, to
sell or dispose of his property, to marry, draft a will, and, in general
to manage his own affairs.
Id. at 68.
Fortunately a list of proposed amendments to AB 4481 prepared by Assem-
blyman Vasconcellos's office includes such language:
A person confined shall not be deemed incapable of informed consent
solely by virtue of being diagnosed as a mentally ill, disordered, abnor-
mal or mentally defective person.
Amendments to 4481, prepared by the office of Assemblyman John Vasconcellos
(Dem.-24th Dist.), at 3, Jan. 28, 1975, [on file with SANTA CLARA LAWYER]
[hereinafter cited as Amendments]; SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 208.
27. See text accompanying notes 182-84 infra.
28. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5326.3(e), 5326.4(e) (West Supp. 1975).
But see text accompanying note 202 infra.
[Vol. 15
1975] PSYCHOSURGERY AND SHOCK TREATMENT 729
irreversible decision affecting a person's welfare demands the ob-
jective scrutiny of a court, which is singularly equipped to insure
adherence to the basic rights of due process and fundamental fair-
ness.
II. INFORMED CONSENT
A. Background
AB 4481 is designed to guarantee a mental patient the right
to refuse psychosurgery or shock treatment.2" Thus, before a
physician can administer these procedures, the patient must
"knowingly and intelligently, without duress or coercion, mani-
fest consent to the treatment." 0  The statute then sets forth
what a physician must explain to a patient before seeking consent.
The explanation must include:
1. an explanation of the procedures used in performing the
treatment;
2. an explanation of the nature and seriousness of the pa-
tient's disorder;
3. an explanation of the patient's right to revoke consent
before or during the procedure;
4. an explanation of reasonable alternative therapies;
5. an explanation of uncertainties associated with the treat-
ment; and
6. an explanation of the hazards associated with the proce-
dures."'
To avoid the new law's stringent penalty provisions 2 or a
29. Cal. Stats. (1974), ch. 1534, at 4328 (West Legislative Service).
30. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326.3 (West Supp. 1975).
31. Id.
32. AB 4481 adds a strong penalty and enforcement provision to sections
5325 and 5326 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The new law provides that
a physician who violates the informed consent provisions of AB 4481 may suffer
a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 5326.5(a) (West Supp. 1975). The physician may also have his
or her license to practice medicine revoked. Id. Further, AB 4481 preserves the
right of an individual whose physician has violated the consent requirements of
the law to bring a civil cause of action in superior court. Id. § 5326.5(b). In
addition, the court is empowered to exact from the defendant reasonable attorney's
fees and court costs for the benefit of the plaintiff. Id.
Pressure from the medical community to modify the stiff penalty provisions
of AB 4481 has been intense. Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1975,
at 44, col. 1. Physicians claim that the fine and license revocation provisions
of the new law are so harsh that they constitute "the taking of their property
without due process of law, and are discriminatory against a single specialty in
the practice of medicine." Complaint at 7, Doe v. Younger, Civil No. 361769
(San Diego Super. Ct., filed Dec. 30, 1974). Drs. Fisher and Rosen of the Lang-
ley-Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute have proposed that the penalty provisions of
AB 4481 be amended to provide that a physician who violates the new law be
reported to the State Board of Medical Examiners and investigated. Fisher &
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possible malpractice suit,83 the psychiatrist who wishes to perform
psychosurgery or administer shock treatment in California will
have to make a complete disclosure to the patient of the risks and
hazards associated with the procedure. The question of how
much information the psychiatrist must disclose is crucial. Since
the requirement of informed consent to psychiatric treatment is
such a new subject, there is little case law on it. However, psy-
chiatrists will be able to draw useful guidelines from the standards
of disclosure courts have imposed on physicians in other areas of
medical practice.
B. Limited vs. Full Disclosure
The recognition of a physician's duty to obtain informed con-
sent before administering medical treatment has been a relatively
new development in American law.34 Although informed consent
Rosen, Suggested Amendments to AB 4481, at 3, Nov. 20, 1974, [on file with
SANTA CLARA LAWYER]. The Fisher-Rosen amendment would subject a physician to
"whatever penalty, if any, the Board feels to be warranted." Id. This amendment
has been criticized by commentators on the ground that it would eliminate the
enforcement function of the state Attorney General's office. Supporters of AB
4481's penalty provisions argue that the enforcement of the law must remain inde-
pendent of the mental institution administering the treatment. Roth, Analysis of
AB 4481, at 10, Dec. 28, 1974, [on file with SANTA CLARA LAWYER]. Removing
the enforcement power presently vested in the Attorney General's office would
take the teeth out of the new law.
In response to the medical community's demand for a modification of AB
4481's penalty provisions, Assemblyman Vasconcellos has proposed an amendment
to AB 4481 which would reduce the maximum penalty to $5,000 and provide for
an investigation of alleged violations by the State Board of Medical Examiners.
Amendments, supra note 26, at 6. The investigation could lead to possible license
revocation. Vasconcellos's amendment would retain the enforcement power in the
office of the Attorney General. Id.
33. See, e.g., Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965), and Mitchell v.
Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), in which the Missouri court recognized
the duty of physicians to obtain informed consent before administering shock
treatment.
34. The modern concept of informed consent developed after the turn of the
century in the well-known case of Hunter v. Burroughs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S.E. 360
(1918). The plaintiff in Burroughs sued his doctor to recover for bums he sus-
tained as a result of X-ray treatments used to treat a skin disorder. The suit was
based on two grounds: (1) that the doctor was allegedly negligent for breaching
his duty to inform the patient of the possible risks which were involved in the
X-ray treatment, and (2) that the treatment had been negligently administered.
Id. at -, 96 S.E. at 362-63. The court held that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain a finding of negligent treatment. Id. at -, 96 S.E. at 371. However,
the court analyzed the concept of informed consent and approved plaintiff's con-
tention that "it is the duty of a physician in the exercise of ordinary care to warn
a patient of the danger of possible bad consequences of using a remedy." Id. at
-, 96 S.E. at 366. In effect, the court found that the "defendant had misled
plaintiff by not only not giving him the warning aforesaid, but by affirmatively
assuring him that if the treatment was applied, plaintiff's condition would be
cured." Id. at -, 96 S.E. at 366-67.
Failure to obtain informed consent was first recognized as a possible basis
of recovery in a 1957 California case, Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of
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is a requirement in all jurisdictions,85 courts are divided on what
constitutes sufficient disclosure by a physician before a patient can
render meaningful consent. Most courts have applied a limited
disclosure standard which requires a physician to provide as much
information concerning the procedure as would ordinarily be pro-
vided by competent doctors in the community who administer the
same treatment.3 Other courts, including the California Supreme
Court, have applied a full disclosure standard under which a physi-
cian must consider what information concerning a proposed treat-
ment is necessary to afford the opportunity to give meaningful
consent.8
7
Under the full disclosure standard, liability is founded on a
physician's failure to provide the patient with sufficient informa-
tion to make a meaningful choice between the risks inherent in
the treatment and the consequences of forgoing such treatment.38
In an action by a patient against the physician for failure to render
informed consent, the basic issue for consideration by the trier of
fact is whether the physician has disclosed all the risks that would
be deemed material by a reasonable person confronted with the
decision whether to undergo the proposed treatment.89
The limited disclosure standard favors the physician in a mal-
practice suit, because the plaintiff must establish that the physician
not only failed to inform him of the risks involved, but also that
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957). The plaintiff in Salgo
had become paralyzed allegedly as a result of a negligently performed injection
into his spinal cord. Although the Salgo court reversed the plaintiff's lower court
judgment, it suggested that lull disclosure of all risks would be required when a
physician seeks to obtain consent to surgery from a patient. The court found that
beyond certain bounds of discretion, a doctor was in breach of duty to a patient
if he did not fully reveal all the facts the patient needed to render a meaningful
consent. Id. at 578, 317 P.2d at 181.
Another important case that dealt with the issue of informed consent was
Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960). The plaintiff in Natan-
son alleged that her physician had been negligent in administering radiation ther-
apy to treat breast cancer. In reversing a judgment for the defendant for an er-
roneous instruction on negligence, the Kansas Supreme Court commented that a
physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to lia-ility for malpractice . . . if he makes no disclosure of significant facts
within his knowledge which are necessary to form the basis of an in-
telligent consent.
Id. at -, 350 P.2d 1095 (1960).
35. HEALTH LAW CENTER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 68 (2d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW].
36. Id.
37. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Woods v. Brumlop,
71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962). For an excellent discussion of the informed
consent issue, see Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L.
REv. 628 (1969).
38. PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW, supra note 35, at 70.
39. Id.
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the failure to inform constituted a deviation from the procedure
normally employed by other physicians practicing in the com-
munity.4" Such "deviations" from community practice must be
proved by the use of expert testimony.4' Without expert testi-
mony, the plaintiff's case will be dismissed despite its merits.42
Although the limited disclosure standard is clearly the ma-
jority position in the United States today, there is a distinct trend
towards the full disclosure approach.43  In a series of well-
reasoned opinions, California, 44 New Mexico, 45 and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia 46 have each adopted the full
disclosure standard.
C. California's Informed Consent Standard
In adopting the full disclosure standard, the California
Supreme Court, in Cobbs v. Grant, criticized the limited disclosure
approach:
Even if there can be said to be a medical community standard
as to the disclosure requirement, it appears so nebulous that
doctors become, in effect, vested with absolute discretion.
... Unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable
with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate in-
formed decision regarding the course of treatment to which
he knowingly consents to be subjected. 47
The Cobbs court enunciated certain disclosure guidelines
based on whether a proposed procedure was "complicated" or
"simple."48  A different standard applies to each type of proce-
dure. For instance, if a proposed treatment is "simple," the doc-
tor does not have to describe remote risks.4 On the other hand,
40. Note, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure,
48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 548, 551 (1973).
41. Id. at 551-52. See, e.g., Di Filippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d
333 (1961); Haggerty v. McCarthy, 344 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.2d 562 (1962); Rob-
erts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Govin v. Hunter, 374
P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1962).
42. Kessenick & Mankin, Medical Malpractice: The Right to be Informed,
8 U.S.F.L. REV. 261, 270 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kessenick & Mankin];
Note, Medical Malpractice-Expert Testimony, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 834, 835-37
(1966); Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Its Place in Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 343, 355 (1973). But see Fox, Should Medical Reports
be Obtained from the Plaintiff's Expert in Malpractice Cases?, 1 L.A. TRIAL LAW.
AsS'N ADVOCATE, Nov. 1973, at 1, wherein the author contends that it is much
easier to obtain expert testimony against a doctor today than it once was.
43. Kessenick & Mankin, supra note 42, at 270.
44. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
45. Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
46. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
47. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
48. Id. at 244, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
49. Id.
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if the procedure is "complicated," the physician is obligated to de-
scribe all possible risks, regardless of how remote."0 The Cobbs
court felt that a patient should be informed of all the important
facts regarding the treatment and then be allowed to weigh his
or her subjective fears and hopes against the disclosed risks be-
fore deciding whether to consent.5 ' This position is founded upon
the notion that since consent does not require a medical evalua-
tion, it should be reserved to the patient alone. 2
The Cobbs court recognized that the full disclosure concept
does not apply in those emergency situations where a patient is
unconscious and in need of immediate attention,5 3 or where a
physician is dealing with a minor or a mental incompetent., 4 As
a general rule, a minor's consent is considered ineffective and a
physician is required to obtain permission from the minor's parents
or guardians before administering any medical treatment. The
same rule applies if a person has been properly judged mentally
incompetent.55 If an adult is conscious and competent, he or she
usually has an absolute right to refuse medical treatment or sur-
gery, and a physician will be liable for battery if treatment is ad-
ministered without consent.
Cobbs v. Grant involved the disclosure requirement for
informed consent to which a physician must adhere before he or
50. Id. In requiring a full disclosure standard, the Cobbs court held that the
physician is not required to render a
lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications. A mini-
course in medical science is not required; the patient is concerned with
the risk of death or bodily harm, and the problems of recuperation.
For an excellent analysis of Cobbs, see Kessenick & Mankin, supra note 42.
51. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
52. Id.
53. Id. This exception is recognized in all jurisdictions. See PROBLEMS IN
HOSPITAL LAw, supra note 35, at 88-89. The so-called "emergency" exception
to the informed consent requirement is often confused with the notion of implied
consent. Implied consent exists when particular words or acts of a patient man-
ifest his willingness to consent to the procedure. The emergency exception applies
only when, due to dire circumstances, neither the patient nor one authorized to
consent for the patient is able to give consent, permitting the physician to perform
the necessary surgery to which consent undoubtedly would have been given had
the patient been competent and able to comprehend the situation. Id. at 70. See
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 101, 103 (4th ed. 1971).
54. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. "Mental incom-
petent" here refers to those persons adjudicated incompetent in a judicial incompe-
tency proceeding. The term does not apply to persons receiving treatment for
mental illness.
55. PROBLEMS IN HosPITAL LAW, supra note 35, at 82 (minor), 86 (mental
incompetent).
56. Id. at 90. The following cases support the assertion that a medical opera-
tion or treatment without consent constitutes a battery: Berkey v. Anderson, 1
Cal. App. 3d 790, 803, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 76-77 (1970); Pedesky v. Bleiberg, 251
Cal. App. 2d 119, 123, 59 Cal. Rptr. 294, 297 (1967); see also Comment, Consent
to Surgery-A Dilemma, 37 ALBANY L. REv. 591 (1973).
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she can administer conventional medical treatment. Because AB
4481 requires that the same informed consent be obtained from
mental patients, the full disclosure standard enunciated in Cobbs
should apply to the use of psychosurgery and shock treatment as
well. Both these techniques are "complicated" procedures which
involve a risk of death or serious injury. Therefore, under Cobbs,
the psychiatrist would seem to be obligated to disclose the poten-
tially lethal nature of the treatment, "the available choices with
respect to the proposed therapy [and] . . . the damages in-
herently and potentially involved in each," before seeking a men-
tal patient's consent to either treatment. 57
III. AB 4481 AND PSYCHOSURGERY
A. Background
Since lobotomies are rarely performed anymore in the United
States,5 8 the California Legislature has substituted the word
"psychosurgery" for "lobotomy" in the Welfare and Institutions
Code.519 Psychosurgery refers to the removal or destruction of
57. 8 Cal. 3d at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The physician's
duty to disclose all known risks with respect to complicated medical procedures
raises the question of whether this duty includes risks not known to the physician,
but discoverable by referring to medical literature.
58. Mark, Psychosurgery versus Anti-psychiatry, 54 B.U.L. REV. 217, 218
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Mark].
59. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325(g) (West Supp. 1975). AB 4481
includes within its definition of psychosurgery "those operations currently referred
to as lobotomy, psychiatric surgery, and behavioral surgery and all other forms
of brain surgery" if the surgery is performed for "modification or control of
thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior." Id.
Other definitions of psychosurgery include:
[1] Brain surgery, the primary purpose of which is to seek the altera-
tion of thoughts, patterns of social behavior, various personality charac-
teristics, or emotional relations.
Chorover, Psychosurgery: A Neurological Perspective, 54 B.U.L. REV. 231(1974) [hereinafter cited as Chorover].
[2] Surgery on the frontal lobes or their connections in the brain to
treat the symptoms of intractable depression, agitation, compulsion, delu-
sion, hallucination and ideas of reference in patients with no known
brain disease.
Mark, supra note 58, at 217.
Different types of psychosurgery include:
1. cingulumotomy-most prevalent type of psychosurgery. Not per-
formed to treat disorders thought to be connected with violent be-
havior, but rather to alleviate symptoms of neuro-psychiatric illnesses
like depression, anxiety, and other untreatable neuroses.
2. thalamotomy-used to treat Parkinson's disease. Dr. O.J. Andy at
the University of Mississippi uses the thaamotomy to treat what he
calls "hyper-responsive syndrome" which he believes is the cause of
violent, unmanageable behavior in some patients.
3. amygdalotomy-originally used to treat epilepsy; some theorize thisis the portion of the brain which is the source of violent behavior
in some people.
1975] PSYCHOSURGERY AND SHOCK TREATMENT 735
healthy brain tissue to affect or modify behavior. Brain surgery,
on the other hand, involves the removal of diseased brain cells
to relieve organic disorders such as tumors.6 ° The new statute
recognizes this important distinction when it speaks of psychosur-
gery as surgery to modify thoughts or behavior, as opposed to the
treatment of "known and diagnosed physical disease[s] of the
brain."61
B. History of Psychosurgery
The history of psychosurgery can be traced to the 18th
century phrenologists who believed that certain relationships ex-
isted between portions of the brain and human behavior.62
Phrenologists employed complicated schematic diagrams and intri-
cate measuring devices to study these relationships. Their sim-
plistic and unsubstantiated claims have been discredited in the
scientific community today, but critics of psychosurgery compare
modem advocates of surgery to modify behavior with the early
phrenologists. 63 These critics feel that psychosurgery advocates
are wrong in assuming that specific brain structures can be corre-
lated to specific patterns of behavior. 4
Brain surgery designed to modify human behavior can be
traced to the 1890's when Dr. G. Burkhardt, a Swiss psychiatrist,
began removing portions of patients' brains to control their
behavior. Although Burkhardt was successful in controlling his
patients' violent behavior, he discontinued his activities because
of pressure from colleagues in the medical community who were
disturbed by the ethical implications of using brain surgery to con-
trol behavior.65
Further development of psychosurgery was delayed until
1935 when a Portugese scientist, Egas Moniz, and a colleague con-
ducted a series of experiments to determine whether the behavior
of disturbed patients could be controlled.66 At first, Moniz tried
cutting a small round hole in the skull near the temple and insert-
ing alcohol to coagulate the fiber tracts between the frontal lobes
Holden, Psychosurgery: Legitimate Therapy or Laundered Lobotomy?, 179
SCIENCE 1109 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Holden].
60. SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 248.
61. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325(g)(1) (West Supp. 1975).
62. Chorover, supra note 59, at 232. Phrenology is the study of skull config-
urations as an indicator of mental faculties and traits. For an interesting per-
spective on the history of psychosurgery see id. at 232-35.
63. Id. at 232.
64. Id.; SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 246.
65. N. KiTrIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 305 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KIrrRIE].
66. Chorover, supra note 59, at 234.
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and other parts of the brain.6 7  The alcohol coagulation did not
work well, so Moniz begain cutting the fibers with a special knife
called a leucotome.6 s  After twenty such operations, the Portu-
guese government forced Muniz to stop."
The lobotomy procedure nevertheless attracted world-wide
attention, and from the late 1930's to the early 1960's, frontal lo-
botomies were hailed as an important breakthrough in the treat-
ment of severely disturbed mental patients. 70  Approximately
50,000 were performed in the United States between 1940 and
1960.71 Unfortunately, enthusiastic lobotomy advocates under-
played the fact that this "great breakthrough" often left patients
apathetic, asocial, and intellectually blunted. 72  The use of loboto-
mies virtually disappeared in the United States with the develop-
ment of powerful drugs called phenothiazines, by which the ef-
fects of a lobotomy could be achieved without surgery. 73
Doctors in recent years have developed a surgical technique
which utilizes electrodes composed of fine wires to penetrate the
brain.74 Using a complicated coordinate system, a surgeon can
implant the electrodes inside the brain and, by applying varying
degrees of electrical shock, stimulate or destroy desired portions
of brain tissue.75  This technique, called stereotaxic surgery, is far
superior to the earlier forms of brain surgery which required the
surgeon manually to cut through or remove portions of the brain
in order to reach areas under the skull.76
67. KrrTrRiE, supra note 65, at 305; Chorover, supra note 59, at 234.
68. Chorover, supra note 59, at 234.
69. SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 244.
70. Drs. W. Freeman and J. Watts performed the first lobotomies in the
United States in 1936. KrrrIE, supra note 65, at 305.
71. Statement by Dr. Bertram S. Brown, Director of the National Institute
of Mental Health, in Hearings on S. 974, S. 878 and S.J. Res. 71 Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 340 (1973).
Early statistics revealed that lobotomies produced serious consequences. One
study indicated that out of 624 lobotomies performed during a certain period, 3.6
percent resulted in death and 51.5 percent resulted in undesirable side effects such
as partial paralysis, bladder control problems, and convulsions. Lobotomies also
frequently produced in a patient listlessness, lack of ambition, and a diminished
capacity to form abstract thought or react to conscience. In addition, lobotomies
were often resorted to-unfortunately-to control and subdue patients deemed to
be disciplinary problems. KrrrnE, supra note 65, at 305-06.
72. KITTRIE, supra note 65, at 305-06.
73. Holden, supra note 59, at 1109.
74. Chorover, supra note 59, at 236.
75. Id.
76. Id. For discussions of recent developments in the field of stereotaxic
surgery, see Chorover, supra note 59, at 236-37 (implantation of wireless telem-
etry components); I. COOPER, THE VICTIM Is ALWAYS THE SAME (1974) (freezing
portions of the brain through cryosurgery); and Holden, supra note 59, at 1112
(curing anorexia nervosa-self-induced starvation).
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Very little research has been conducted to determine the ef-
fects of psychosurgery on human behavior. Experiments have
demonstrated, however, that psychosurgery can cause dramatic
changes in the social behavior of monkeys. 77 Marked decreases
in aggressive behavior have been observed in connection with the
removal of a monkey's amygdala, a portion of the brain which acts
as a "relay center" for sexual and aggressive impulses.78
Amygdalectomized monkeys were found to be incapable of engag-
ing in basic social interaction with other monkeys, assuming in-
stead an attitude of fearful confusion when confronted by others
of their species. 79  Researchers found that when these monkeys
were returned to their previous troop (in a free-ranging colony
habitat) they were ostracized by members of their species and
eventually starved or were killed by predators.80 Considerable
controversy has developed in the scientific community over both
the ethical and medical problems involved with psychosurgery.8 '
The controversy has focused largely on the work of three doctors
who strongly support psychosurgery as a means of correcting brain
dysfunctions, which they claim cause violent behavior in certain
people.82 Critics argue that because there is little research or con-
clusive evidence demonstrating the benefits of psychosurgery on
humans, experiments of this type should be carefully controlled
or limited strictly to animals.8 3
C. Informed Consent and Psychosurgery
California's new legislation establishes the right of a mental
patient to refuse psychosurgery, but it does not recognize that in-
stitutional coercion may impair a patient's ability to consent to psy-
chosurgery. The notion of institutional coercion raises questions
about any legislation which permits a patient to consent to such a
77. Kling, Effects of Amygdalectomy on Social-Affective Behavior in Non-
Human Primates, in THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF THE AMYGDALA 511 (B. Eleftheriou
ed. 1972), cited in Chorover, supra note 59, at 238-39.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970); Annas
& Glantz, Psychosurgery: The Law's Response, 54 B.U.L. REV. 249 (1974);
Chorover, Big Brother and Psychotechnology 1I: The Pacification of the Brain,
7 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May, 1974, at 59; Lowinger, The Detroit Case-Psycho-
surgery, 170 THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 13, 1974, at 17 [hereinafter cited as
Lowinger]; Spoonhour, supra note 7.
82. The three doctors are William Sweet, Chief of Neurosurgery at the
Massachusetts General Hospital; Vernon Mark, Chief of Neurosurgery at Boston
City Hospital; and Frank Ervin, a psychiatrist and neurologist at U.C.L.A..
Holden, supra note 59, at 1104.
83. Lowinger, supra note 81, at 19; Chorover, supra note 59, at 232.
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drastic and irreversible form of treatment.84 The effect of coercion
becomes especially acute with patients who have been involuntarily
hospitalized for a substantial period of time. Because the only case
which has dealt with the issue of informed consent to psycho-
surgery involved a mental patient who had been institutionalized
for almost twenty years, the discussion in this comment will focus
primarily on the consent of the long-term involuntary detainee.
However, serious questions remain as to the propriety of allowing
any mental patient-regardless of the period of hospitalization--
to undergo psychosurgery. It has been suggested that the use of
all psychosurgery on human beings should be suspended until the
scientific and ethical ramifications of such experimental surgery
are better understood. 8
D. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health8"
The only case that has dealt with the issue of informed
consent to psychosurgery is a 1973 Michigan (Wayne County Cir-
cuit Court) decision, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health.
Kaimowitz involved a mental patient, L.S., who had been com-
mitted to a state hospital under Michigan's criminal sexual psycho-
path law for raping and murdering a nurse at a previous mental
institution. The record indicates that L.S. had been institutional-
ized since 1955 .8' He consented to participate in experimental
research 8 being conducted at the Lafayette Clinic of Wayne State
University, aimed at controlling aggressive behavior in persons
84. Spoonhour, in his excellent analysis of psychosurgery and informed con-
sent, urges states to enact legislation to regulate carefully psychosurgery. In ad-
dition, he recommends
a requirement that the physician or institution show that the consenting
patient's decision was voluntary and not subject to coercion or pressure,
thereby effectively barring consent by an imprisoned person or a pa-
tient institutionalized involuntarily or for a lengthy period.
Spoonhour, supra note 7, at 452 (emphasis added).
Spoonhour concludes, upon the basis of his thorough analysis of the law re-
garding informed consent in analogous areas, that compliance with a requirement
such as the one above, would be necessary to satisfy the tests that have been
formulated by the courts. Lowinger concurs with Spoonhour and the Kaimowitz
court that psychosurgery should be prohibited on prison inmates and long-term
involuntarily detained mental patients altogether. Lowinger, supra note 81, at 19.
85. See SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 247; Breggin, The Return of Lobotomy
and Psychosurgery, 118 CONG. REC. 26 (1972) (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972).
86. Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10,
1973).
87. Id.
88. The Michigan Legislature had appropriated $228,400 (Holden, supra note
59, at 1111) for twenty-eight patients to undergo study for the control of aggres-
sive behavior at the Lafayette Clinic. Lowinger, supra note 81, at 17.
Worthy of note is the great interest in this type of research displayed not
only by the Michigan Legislature but also by the federal government. In 1970,
the Neuro-Research Foundation was established at Boston City Hospital to study
the control of violent behavior in human beings. Congress directed the National
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suffering from "severe uncontrollable aggressive outbursts."89
Drs. J.S. Gottlieb and Ernest Rodin of the Lafayette Clinic, the
primary sponsors of the project, argued in their proposal for the
research that certain types of aggressive behavior seemed to be
linked to electrical abnormalities in the brain's limbic system.90 If
the section of the brain which triggers these abnormalities were
removed, the doctors argued, the person's violent behavior might
be controlled, allowing him to return to a normal life in the com-
munity.91
The Lafayette project called for experimentation on approxi-
mately twelve patients over the course of one year. 2 After initial
neurological, psychiatric, and psychological evaluations, each pa-
tient was to be operated on by having depth electrodes implanted
in various parts of his brain.93  The readings from the remotely
controlled depth electrodes were to be carefully monitored, and
electrical stimulation of various brain structures under varying de-
grees of environmental stress was to be conducted in order to iden-
tify areas of abnormal function. The affected areas were then to
be removed and examined. Following the removal of the suspect
brain tissue, psychiatric screening of the patients was to be con-
ducted to ascertain the effect of the surgery on various cognitive
and emotional functions. 94
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) to award the foundation $500,000 for its
work. Louis Wienkowski, director of the NIMH, tried without success to dissuade
Congress from making the appropriation. The Neuro-Research Foundation re-
ceived the money with express provisions that no research on humans be under-
taken. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Jus-
tice Department then donated an additional $108,000 to the foundation.
In 1972, the Senate Labor, Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations
Subcommittee earmarked one million dollars for further research in this area to
the National Institute for Neurological Disease and Stroke. Holden, supra note
59, at 1110.
A fascinating, albeit fictional, analysis of some of the political and social im-
plications of this type of research is contained in A. BURGESs, A CLOCKWORK
ORANGE (2d ed. 1972).
89. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973) Appendix Item No. 1,
Proposal for the Study of Uncontrollable Aggression at the Lafayette Clinic, by
J.S. Gottlieb, M.D. & E. Rodin, M.D., at 2.
90. Id. at 2. The limbic system may be described as that area of the brain
which borders and separates the phylogenetically "lower" brain (source of basic
stereotyped behavior patterns) from the more advanced neocortex (source of com-
plex cognitive functions in higher life forms). Signals from the "lower" brain
are transmitted by the limbic system, and it is thought that this system, with its
input of information from the "lower" brain, is responsible for guiding affective
behavior and for a human being's sense of individuality and reality. Chorover,
supra note 59, at 237.
91. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973), at 4.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 3-4. This phase of the project is strikingly similar to the fictional-
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After learning of the Lafayette project, a Detroit attorney and
members of a medical human rights committee filed a complaint
in the Circuit Court of Wayne County, seeking a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of L.S. and others similarly situated in Michigan
mental institutions.9" The complaint alleged that L.S. was being
"illegally detained in the Lafayette Clinic for the purpose of ex-
perimental psychosurgery."9 6  Because of the tremendous public-
ity generated by the suit, the state Department of Mental Health
terminated funding the project, and the experiments were sus-
pended.17
Thereafter, counsel for the Department of Mental Health
moved to dismiss the suit on grounds of mootness. A three-judge
court ruled against the motion to dismiss, reasoning that because
there was no assurance that the project would not be continued
at a later date, the case "was ripe for declaratory judgment.""°
The principal issue before the Kaimowitz court was whether
an involuntarily detained mental patient can render effective con-
ized scenario outlined in M. CRICHTON, THE TERMINAL MAN (1972).
A second phase of the proposed surgery involved the administration of an
experimental antiandrogen substance, which had been used in Europe to treat "se-
vere sexual psychopathy with associated aggressive behavior." Kaimowitz v. De-
partment of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. of Wayne County,
Mich., filed July 10, 1973) Appendix Item No. 1, at 5. For this phase of theproject, another group of twelve patients from Michigan's state hospital system
were to be transferred to the Lafayette Clinic and their "testicular function . . .
depressed by antiandrogens." Id. at 6. "Environmental manipulation and psy-
chological evaluations" similar to that conducted on the surgical candidates were
to be conducted. Id. The two groups of patients were to be compared closely
to determine the effectiveness of the respective treatments. If the surgery or the
drug sufficiently controlled a patient's violent behavior, then he would be released
into society under close supervision. If the results of the experiments proved to
be unsatisfactory, the individual patient would be detained. Id.
Commentators have been skeptical of the criteria used to select subjects for
the Lafayette Project. Few standards existed for this type of study and the cri-
teria being applied were founded on speculation rather than scientific certainty.
Lowinger, supra note 81, at 18. A good example of the inadequacy of the selec-
tion criteria was the selection of L.S. for the project. A psychiatrist who exam-
ined L.S. at the trial testified that he had manifested no aggressive behavior for
18 years. Id.
Lowinger compares the Lafayette Project with other research conducted on
various disadvantaged groups of individuals. For instance, slaves in the South
prior to the Civil War were used in experiments which led to the development
of ether anesthesia. Experimental research on the poor and helpless was con-ducted in studies at the Willowbrook Hospital in New York, where mentally re-
tarded children were purposely infected with hepatitis to test vaccines, and in tests
of birth control devices among Mexican-Americans in the Southwest, which re-
sulted in unwanted pregnancies. Id.
95. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973), at 1.
96. Id. at 1-2.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 7.
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sent to psychosurgery. 99 The court recognized that the possible
connection between brain dysfunctioning and violence might be
the subject of legitimate study. The court also noted that certain
types of conventional neurosurgical procedures-such as temporal
lobectomy to relieve epilepsy and operations to remove tumors or
alleviate Parkinson's disease-were distinguishable and thus to be
excluded from consideration."'
In deciding whether experimental brain surgery on mental
patients could be justified, the Kaimowitz court applied a risk-
benefit analysis in balancing the inherent dangers of psycho-sur-
gery against its benefits to the individual and society.' The
court considered the fact that there was no known medical syn-
drome associated with violent behavior. 10 2 It also noted that no
assurance could be given by the doctors that the patients subjected
to surgery could safely be returned to society.103 In addition, the
Kaimowitz court observed that the state of knowledge respecting
psychosurgery on humans was limited and that experiments on
monkeys had resulted in erratic behavior in the animals, charac-
terized by heightened rage reaction or placidity."0
Turning to the ethical considerations involved in the La-
fayette project, the court emphasized that in a free society, "one
of a person's greatest rights is the right to inviolability of his per-
son." 105 Because of this right, a physician is precluded from un-
consented to violation of a patient's "bodily integrity.' '10 6
The reasoning employed by the Kaimowitz court has particu-
lar relevance to an analysis of the provisions for informed consent
set forth in AB 4481. It is noteworthy that the court found guid-
ance for its discussion of informed consent in the judgments of
the military tribunals that tried German war criminals following
World War 11.107 The court agreed with the Nuremberg judges
that:
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. at 10-11.
101. Id. at 13, 16, 22.
102. Id. at 16-17.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. See text accompanying notes 77-80.
105. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973), at 18.
106. Id.
107. The Nuremburg Tribunal found that:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essen-
tial.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to
give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power
of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit,
duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion;
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements
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[T]he involuntarily detained mental patient must have
legal capacity to give consent. He must be so situated as to
be able to exercise free power of choice without any element
of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior
form of restraint or coercion. He must have sufficient know-
ledge and comprehension of the subject matter to enable him
to make an understanding decision. The decision must be
a totally voluntary one on his part. 08
In the most important part of its analysis, the Kaimowitz court
of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding
and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject, there
should be made known to him the nature, duration and purpose of the
experiment; the methods and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects
upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participa-
tion in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the con-
sent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the
experiment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be
delegated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results
of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the
disease or other problem under study that the anticipated results will jus-
tify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unneces-
sary physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori
reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, per-
haps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians also serve
as subjects.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that deter-
mined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by
the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities pro-
vided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities
of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically quali-
fied persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required
through all stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in
the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should
be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the
physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to
him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must
be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable
cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and
careful judgment required of him that a continuation of the experiment
is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental sub-
ject.
United States v. Karl Brandt, Trial of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Mili-
tary Tribunals, Vols. 1 & 2, THE MEDICAL CASE (U.S. Printing Office 1948), re-
printed in S. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 305 (Russell Sage
Foundation 1972).
108. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973), at 24-25.
[Vol. 15
1975] PSYCHOSURGERY AND SHOCK TREATMENT 743
considered three factors-competency, knowledge of risks, and
voluntariness-to be determinative in ascertaining whether a long-
term involuntary detainee was capable of rendering an informed
consent. 10 9 The court reasoned that because of a patient's "men-
tal condition, the deprivation stemming from involuntary confine-
ment, and the effects of the phenomenon of 'institutionaliza-
tion,' "110 his ability to render informed consent is seriously under-
mined."'
As to the second element-knowledge of risks-the court
summarily concluded that because the effects of psychosurgery are
so uncertain, "knowledgeable consent to psychosurgery [is] liter-
ally impossible."" 2
Regarding the voluntariness element, the court noted that
one reason L.S. had consented to the psychosurgery was his desire
to demonstrate to his doctors that he was cooperative. The court
recognized that the involuntarily detained mental patient will often
tell his doctor what he thinks the doctor wants to hear.1 3 The
record indicates that L.S. had been told that if he consented to
the experiment he might be released." 4  This desire to cooperate
with institutional authorities formed part of the coercive atmos-
phere which tainted L.S.'s consent to psychosurgery. 115  The
Kaimowitz court concluded that the coercive environment of the
mental institution precludes mental patients from reasoning as
equals with their doctors, and that this "inherent inequality" ren-
ders it impossible for the patient to give a truly informed
consent."16
The proponents of the Lafayette project went to great lengths
to obtain what they considered to be a valid informed consent from
L.S." 7 On the surface, it appeared that meticulous attention had
109. Id. at 22.
110. Id. at 25.
111. Id.
112. id. at 27.
113. Id. at 28-29.
114. Id. at 28.
115. Id. at 29.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 3-4. This is the consent form that L.S. signed:
Since conventional treatment efforts over a period of several years
have not enabled me to control my outbursts of rage and anti-social be-
havior, I submit an application to be a subject in a research project
which may offer me a form of effective therapy. This therapy is based
upon the idea that episodes of anti-social rage and sexuality might be
triggered by a disturbance in certain portions of my brain. I understand
that in order to be certain that a significant brain disturbance exists,
which might relate to my anti-social behavior, an initial operation will
have to be performed. This procedure consists of placing fine wires into
my brain, which will record the electrical activity from those structures
which play a part in anger and sexuality. These electrical waves can
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been paid to all the legal requirements for informed consent;11
yet, upon the court's careful scrutiny of the mental institution's in-
herently coercive atmosphere, it became clear that no truly
informed consent was possible." 9
Because it thoroughly analyzes the problem of informed
consent to psychosurgery, the Kaimowitz opinion is helpful in con-
sidering the strengths and weaknesses of AB 4481.120 Since Cali-
fornia's new law allows a long-term involuntary detainee to
consent to psychosurgery, it is arguable that the legislature failed
to recognize the problem of inherent coercion in the mental insti-
tution.'21  AB 4481 should be amended to prohibit psychosurgery
on patients who have been confined for a substantial period of
time,1 22 except under the most extreme circumstances. Even
then it should be permitted only under the strictest supervision.
then be studied to determine the presence of an abnormality.
In addition electrical stimulation with weak currents passed through
these wires will be done in order to find out if one or several points
in the brain can trigger my episodes of violence or unlawful sexuality.
In other words this stimulation may cause me to want to commit an ag-
gressive or sexual act, but every effort will be made to have a sufficient
number of people present to control me. If the brain disturbance is lim-
ited to a small area, I understand that the investigators will destroy this
part of my brain with an electrical current. If the abnormality comes
from a larger part of my brain, I agree that it should be surgically re-
moved, if the doctors determine that it can be done so, without risk of
side effects. Should the electrical activity from the parts of my brain
into which the wires have been placed reveal that there is no significant
abnormality, the wires will simply be withdrawn.
I realize that any operation on the brain carries a number of risks
which may be slight, but could be potentially serious. These risks in-
clude infection, bleeding, temporary or permanent weakness or paralysis
of one or more of my legs or arms, difficulties with speech and thinking,
as well as the ability to feel, touch, pain and temperature. Under extra-
ordinary circumstances, it is also possible that I might not survive the
operation.
Fully aware of the risks detailed in the paragraphs above, I au-
thorize the physicians of Lafayette Clinic and Providence Hospital to
perform the procedures as outlined above.
Id. at 3-4 n.5.
118. Id. at 5. For a thoughtful criticism of the use of medical committees
which decide whether valid consent has been obtained, see Offir, Psychosurgery
and the Law-The Movement to Pull Out the Electrodes, 7 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
May, 1974, at 69. Offir points out that (1) no independent investigation of the
Lafayette project was undertaken before its approval, and (2) one of the lay mem-
bers of the review committee indicated he had approved of the Project because
of the "good intentions and technical competence" of the hospital personnel in-
volved. Id. at 70.
119. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
(Cir. Ct. of Wayne County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973), at 31.
120. Kaimowitz has already begun to play a role in developing statutory guide-
lines for the regulation of psychosurgery. See Mich. Stats., P.A. 258, § 716, at
638 (West Legislative Service 1974). A comprehensive analysis of the Michigan
legislation is contained in Morris, Institutionalizing the Rights of Mental Patients,
62 CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1974).
121. See note 84 supra.
122. Unfortunately, a list of proposed amendments to AB 4481 prepared by
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IV. AB 4481 AND SHOCK TREATMENT
A. Background
As it does with reference to psychosurgery, 123 AB 4481
requires that the treating physician who feels shock treatment is
necessary must first fully advise the patient of its risks as well as
its benefits. 12 4 The physician must then obtain the unanimous ap-
proval of a review committee composed of three doctors. The
review committee also has to determine whether the patient is
capable of rendering informed consent. 2 ' At this point AB 4481
makes an important distinction between psychosurgery and shock
treatment. If the review committee determines that the patient
is incapable of rendering informed consent, psychosurgery may
not be performed.' 26 However, upon the same conclusion as to
the patient's capacity to consent, shock treatment may be adminis-
tered over the patient's objections if the committee believes the
treatment is medically justified.' 2 ' Presumably, the rationale for
the distinction is that shock treatment is less drastic than psycho-
surgery, since it does not involve removal of a portion of the pa-
tient's brain. Some psychiatrists argue that shock treatment may
even be necessary, in certain instances, to save a patient's life.
128
Psychosurgery, on the other hand, will rarely be necessary to save
a patient's life 2' and is therefore prohibited by the new law,
absent a showing of the patient's capacity to render his or her
informed consent.1
3 0
The shock treatment provisions of AB 4481 recently have
received a good deal of attention in the press. 13  The debate over
shock treatment is polarized between those who view it as an ef-
fective and relatively harmless medical technique132 and others
Assemblyman Vasconcellos fails to include such a prohibition. Amendments,
supra note 26.
It will be difficult for legislatures to determine what period of time is "sub-
stantial." L.S. has been institutionalized for almost seventeen years. Kaimo-
witz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. of Wayne
County, Mich., filed July 10, 1973), at 2-3.
123. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326.3 (West Supp. 1975).
124. Id. § 5326.4(1)-(6).
125. Id. § 5326.4(e). But see text accompanying note 202 infra.
126. Id. § 5326.3(b).
127. Id. § 5326.4(f). But see text accompanying note 202 infra.
128. Margolis, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 26, 1974, at 44, col. 2 (letter
to the editor).
129. But see discussion of stereotaxic surgery, supra note 76.
130. CA.. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326.3(b) (West Supp. 1975).
131. See, e.g., San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, Jan. 19, 1975,
§ A, at 4, col. 1; San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 21, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
132. Statement of Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute Concerning Elec-
troconvulsive Therapy, subd. 2, Dec. 9, 1974 [on file with SANTA CLARA LAW-
YER].
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who analogize its use to forcible rape.1"' A brief survey of the
history and nature of shock treatment will help to illustrate why
it has become so controversial an issue.
B. History of Shock Treatment
The term "shock treatment" encompasses those methods of
psychiatric therapy in which drugs, hormones, or electric shock are
used to induce a convulsive state in the body.134  The history of
shock treatment dates back to the 1930's when scientists discov-
ered that certain symptoms of psychosis could be alleviated if
coma or convulsions were induced in patients by injecting insulin
into the body." 5  In 1933, an earlier researcher in the field, Dr.
M. Sakel, investigated the use of insulin therapy to treat schizo-
phrenia. 1"6 Within a few years, other researchers began to ex-
periment with such drugs as metrazol to induce shock (either a
coma or convulsions) in mental patients." 7 The use of metrazol
was pioneered by Dr. L. von Meduna. 3 8 Sakel and von Meduna
were pioneers of what is known as "pharmacologic" or drug-
induced shock treatment. The research conducted by these two
men also inspired an Italian scientist named Ugo Cerletti to ex-
periment with the use of electrically induced convulsions to treat
mental disorders.'
Cerletti and his assistant, Bini, administered the first electro-
shock treatment on a human being in 1938. Their technique was
to induce an epileptic-like seizure in a patient by applying a 70-
130 volt shock for a fraction of a second through electrodes
attached to the subject's skull.' 40 Cerletti's announcement of suc-
cess in treating psychotic symptoms with his new technique' soon
133. Statement by Wade Hudson, supra note 14, at 4. The use of shock treat-
ment to intimidate and coerce patients is vividly portrayed in K. KESEY, ONE
FLEW OvER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1962).
134. Krouner, supra note 10, at 398.
135. Id. at 399.
136. Sakel made the important finding that deeper hypoglycemic states, which
had resulted unintentionally from the treatment of psychosis, usually had a bene-
ficial effect on the psychosis itself. L. KALINOWSKY & P. HOCH, SHOCK TREAT-
MENT AND OTHER SOMATIC TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY 4 (1952) [hereinafter
cited as KALiNOWSKY].
137. Krouner, supra note 10, at 399.
138. Von Meduna, a Hungarian psychiatrist, observed a smaller incidence of
epilepsy among schizophrenics than in the population as a whole. He also noted
that schizophrenic symptoms seemed to disappear for a short time after an epilep-
tic convulsion. Von Meduna tried to induce convulsions in schizophrenic patients
through the use of metrazol. This drug proved to be unrealiable and induced se-
rious side-effects. J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 660
(4th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLEMANi.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Cerletti & Bini, L'Elettroshock, in 19 ARcHmvo GENERALE Di NEu-
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led to widespread use of electroshock therapy (EST) to treat a
variety of mental disorders.142
C. EST-Does It Work?
The procedure for administering EST is as follows: on the
day of treatment the patient is not fed, and all drug therapy is
suspended. Thirty minutes before the treatment, approximately
0.8 mg. of atropine (SO4) is administered in order to decrease sali-
vation and bronchial secretions. 14  Next, a quick-acting barbitur-
ate, such as methohexital or surital, is injected to induce sleep.' 44
One reason for putting the patient to sleep is to help him avoid
the unpleasant sensation associated with the muscle relaxant, suc-
cinylcholine, which is administered after the barbiturate. Suc-
cinlycholine, often called anectine, is used to prevent muscle con-
tractions during the convulsions, which can result in serious bone
fractures. 145  Electrical current is delivered through one or two
electrodes, which are secured against the temple.' 46  A standard
ROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALIS 266 (1938).
142. Krouner, supra note 10, at 401. Because it is technically simpler to ad-
minister, more predictable and "cleaner", EST remains by far the most common
form of shock treatment in use today, although research in other forms of shock
treatment is continuing. See, e.g., Krantz, Manchey, Truitt, Ling & Kurland, The
Availability of Hexafluorodiethyl Ether by Intravenous Injection as a Convulsant
in Psychiatric Treatment, 129 J. NERV. MENT. Dis. 92 (1959). For more ex-
tensive discussion of pharmacologic shock treatment, see KALINOWSKY, supra note
136, at 6-94.
Electroshock therapy, which is also referred to as shock therapy, electro-
coma, electric treatment, electroconvulsive therapy, convulsive therapy, and brief-
stimulus therapy, has been defined as "the administration of an electric current
directly to the surface of the head to induce an artificial epileptic seizure in order
to ameliorate disabling symptoms." Letter from Dr. Leon Epstein, Acting Di-
rector of the Langley Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute, San Francisco, to Marc
Frauenfelder, Coordinator, San Francisco Mental Health Advisory Board, Jan. 17,
1975, [on file with SANTA CLARA LAWYER] [hereinafter cited as Letter from Dr.
Epstein].
143. Presentation by Dr. Robert J. Grimm, of the Neurological Sciences Insti-
tute, Good Samaritan Hospital, Portland, Ore. before the Society for Neurosci-
ence, 4th Annual Meeting, St. Louis, Mo. Oct. 23, 1974, at 3 [on file with
SANTA CLARA LAWYER] [hereinafter cited as Grimm].
144. Krouner, supra note 10, at 402. Certain undesirable side effects can
occur as a result of barbiturate anesthesia, including nausea and apnea (prolonga-
tion of respiratory arrest). Barbiturates must be administered carefully during
shock treatment, since patients with certain cardio-vascular ailments may be ad-
versely affected. Id. A normal dosage of surital is between 200-250 mg. Letter
from Dr. Epstein, supra note 142.
145. Before the development of anectine, doctors used curare which is derived
from arrow poisons of South American Indians and is well-known for its strong
paralytic effects. The use of curare in shock treatment often resulted in asphyxia-
tion because of the prolonged paralysis of the respiratory muscles. Anectine is
much more reliable and predictable. Krouner, supra note 10, at 402.
146. The two principal methods of administering EST are "unilateral EST"
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40-100 milliampere shock is administered for a half to one-and-
one-half second interval. 147  Oxygen is provided during the treat-
ment to aid in respiration, which might be impaired by the relax-
ing effect of the succinylcholine upon the lungs. 141 Once the
actual convulsion begins, it will last for thirty to forty seconds.' 49
Semi-consciousness is usually regained in several minutes, but the
patient is not fully conscious for approximately thirty minutes fol-
lowing the treatment.' 50
Typically, EST will be administered between six and fifteen
times at one- or two-day intervals."' When EST is used to treat
schizophrenia, the number of treatments will be increased, rang-
ing from sixteen to twenty-five, and spaced at shorter intervals.' 2
From numerous studies conducted over the past twenty years
to measure the effects of EST on the human body,15 scientists
(one electrode applied against the non-dominant hemisphere) and "bilateral EST"
(electrodes attached to both sides of skull).
147. Grimm, supra note 143, at 3. There are variations in the amount of elec-
tric shock used. For instance, the Langley Porter Institute in San Francisco uses
voltages ranging from 120-140 volts-sufficient to deliver a current of 400-600 mil-
liamperes for 0.4 to 0.6 seconds. Letter from Dr. Epstein, supra note 142, at 1.
148. Letter from Dr. Epstein, supra note 142.
149. Grimm, supra note 143, at 3.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id. The Langley-Porter Neuropsychiatric Institute administers an average
of six to ten EST's per patient. Letter from Dr. Epstein, supra note 142.
152. Grimm, supra note 143, at 4. Recently experiments have been conducted
on certain severe cases of schizophrenia, using so-called "regressive EST," which
is a much more intense battery of treatments at closer intervals. The "effective-
ness" of the treatment according to the researchers, derives from the occurrence
of a phenomenon called "clinical regression," characterized as a "state of helpless-
ness, apathy, confusion, memory loss, speech alteration, and gross disorientation."
Regressive EST has only met with limited "success." Typical regressive EST
treatment consists of shocks given twice daily, seven days a week. The treatment
is usually continued until regression occurs, usually some six to eight treatments
later. Murillo & Exner, The Effects of Regressive ECT with Process Schizo-
phrenics, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 269 (1973).
153. See Grimm, supra note 143, at 6-10, for an excellent review of the major
studies in the field. Grimm offers the following description of EST's neurochem-
ical effects:
[I]n addition to altering brain permeability to small and large molecules,
and redistributing electrolytes in brain [sic], a considerable number of
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) changes occur following ECT as well as alter-
ations in metabolic brain activity. CSF changes include increases in po-
tassium of intracellular origin, nucleoprotein, fragment debris, nucleases,
transminase, neuraminic acid and choline.
Transient reductions occur in brain concentrations of glycogen, glu-
cose, ATP, concomitant with a rise in lactate, pyrovate and inorganic
phosphate; and there is a significant rise in free fatty acids in brain[sic], especially arachidonic acid. Significantly, RNA content is dimin-
ished and protein synthesis is transiently inhibited. There is a consistent
increase in 5-hydroxytryptamine (serotonin) that persists for 72 hours
in CSF and brain [sic] after the last ECT. Norephrephrine levels in
medulla and pons are also elevated.
Id. at 9-10.
Some of the cardio-vascular effects that have been associated with EST in-
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have learned that EST affects the body in a variety of ways.
Among the effects EST is reported to have produced are such ser-
ious medical complications as permanent epileptic disorders in
previously healthy individuals,"' respiratory ailments, such as
apnea (respiratory distress or arrest), and aggravation of diseases
already present in the lungs, such as tuberculosis. 55 As noted,
the administration of EST has also been known to cause serious
bone fractures.' 56
Scientists disagree over the extent to which brain damage
may be directly attributable to EST.' 5 7  Anti-EST groups argue
that serious brain damage, including memory loss and confusion,
can, and often does, result from the use of EST.' Most scientists
believe that if only a small number of EST treatments are given,
and measures are taken to prevent oxygen deprivation, permanent
brain damage can be avoided.1 59 It is generally conceded that
some memory loss and confusion are unavoidable consequences
of receiving EST. 6 ' Some advocates of EST even contend that
it "cleans" brain circuits, and that the retrograde amnesia which
follows the treatment constitutes its therapeutic value.' 6 '
In addition to memory loss, a certain degree of impaired cog-
nitive functioning results after almost all EST treatments. 62  Stu-
dies of patients who have undergone extensive doses of EST indi-
cate that this treatment may reduce one's overall intelligence
level.' 63  Reduced concentration and attention spans have been
clude: "Massive vagal discharge resulting in bradycardia and hypotension with
diminished cerebral blood flow, quickly followed by compensatory tachycardia
and hypertension" (Altschule, Further Observations on Vagal Influences on the
Heart During Electroshock: Therapy for Mental Disease, 39 AM. HEART J. 88
(1950)); and EKG changes (Bellet, Samuel, Kershbaum, Alfred, and Furst, The
Electrocardiogram During Electric Shock Treatment of Mental Disorders, 201
AM. J. MED. SCI. 167 (1941)).
154. Assael, Centrencephalic Epilepsy Induced by Electrical Convulsive Treat-
ment, 23 ELECTROENCEPH. CLIN. NEUROPHYSIOL. 195 (1967).
155. Krouner, supra note 10, at 5.
156. SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 409.
157. Grimm, supra note 143, at 6.
158. Statement by Wade Hudson, supra note 14, at 3.
159. Letter from Dr. Epstein, supra note 142.
160. Zamora & Kaelbling, Memory and Electroconvulsive Therapy, 122 AM.
J. PSYCHIAT. 546 (1965).
161. See, e.g., J. BRENGELMAN, THE EFFECT OF REPEATED ELECTRIC SHOCKS
ON LEARNING IN DEPRESSIONS (1959); Furlong, The Mythology of Electrocon-
vulsive Therapy, in 13 COMe. PSYCH. 235, 236 (1972).
162. Kendall, Mills & Thale, Comparison of Two Methods of Electroshock in
Their Effect on Cognitive Functions, 20 J. CONSULT. 'PSYCH. 423 (1956); Temp-
ler, Ruff & Armstrong, Cognitive Functioning and Degree of Psychosis in Schizo-
phrenics Given Many Electroconvulsive Treatments, 123 BR. J. PSYCHIAT. 441
(1973).
163. D. KLEIN & J. DAVIs, DIAGNOSIS AND DRUG TREATMENT OF PSYCHIATRIC
DISORDERS 139-72 (1969).
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observed, as well as impairment of the patient's learning capacity
due to damage to portions of the limbic centers of the brain. 1 4
There is little agreement among authorities on the incidence
of death caused by EST." 5 British scientists report that the risk
of death following EST is less than the danger of suicide among
severely depressed patients on whom EST may be administered
as a form of therapy. 1' A study of sixty-two EST-related deaths
in the United States between 1947 and 1952 revealed that thirty-
four were caused by cardio-vascular complications, nineteen by
respiratory complications, four-by cerebral complications, and five
by miscellaneous causes.' 67 By 1970, several hundred deaths at-
tributed to the use of EST were reported in the United States. 68
Since Cerletti's first experiments in 1938, EST has been used
to treat nearly every type of mental disorder known to man, in-
cluding schizophrenia, psychoneurosis, anxiety states, and conver-
sion hysteria.' Despite the development of modem anti-depres-
sant drugs, many authorities consider EST to be the most effec-
tive treatment available for so-called affective disorders like
manic-depressive syndromes, and involutional or senile depres-
sions.' 7 0
164. Hudspeth & Gerbrandt, Electroconvulsive Shock: Conflict, Competition,
Consolidation, and Neuro-Anatomical Functions, 63 PSYCH. BULL. 377 (1965);
Tecce & Tarnell, Focal and Incidental Movement-Time as a Function of Shock
Arousal in Humans, 59 J. PSYCHOL. 155 (1965).
165. See, e.g., Alexander, Gahagan & Lewis, Deaths Following Electrotherapy,
161 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 577 (1965) (5 deaths in 70,000 treatments); Hussar &
Pachter, Myocardial Infarction and Fatal Coronary Insufficiency During Electro-
convulsive Therapy, 204 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1004 (1968) (1 death in 10,000 treat-
ments); Martin, Inside the Asylum, SATURDAY EVENING Posr, Nov. 10, 1956, at
130 (1 in 2000).
166. Malik, Fatal Heart Block and Cardiac Arrest Following ECT, 120 BR.
J. PSYCHIAT. 69 (1972).
167. Maclay, Death Due to Treatment, 46 PRoc. R. Soc. 13 (1953).
168. McKenna, Brooks, Engle & Dalen, Cardiac Arrhythmias During Electro-
shock Therapy: Significance, Prevention and Treatment, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIAT.
530 (1970). The authors point out that there has been little study or documenta-
tion of deaths associated with EST. Id. However, it is well known that EST
can be lethal to patients with serious heart problems. Krouner, supra note 10,
at 403.
169. See KALINOWSKY, supra note 136.
170. See Kalinowsky, Thirty Years of Empiricism, 5 INT'L J. PSYCHIAT. 169(1968); Ottosson, Electroconvulsive Therapy-Electro-Stimulatory or Convulsive
Therapy?, 3 J. NEUROPSYCHIAT. 216 (1962). An affective disorder may be mani-
fested by the sufferer's rapid and extreme change in mood, as from elation to se-
vere depression. COLEMAN, supra note 138, at 321.
Although EST does seem to be effective in treating some affective disorders,
such as severe depression, its usefulness in the treatment of schizophrenia remains
dubious. Letter from Dr. Epstein, supra note 142. See Riddell, The Therapeutic
Efficacy of ECT: A Review of Literature, 8 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHOL. 546 (1963).
The class of schizophrenic disorders known as psychoneurosis includes conversion
hysteria, mild reactive depression, and obsessive-compulsive syndrome. These
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Few psychiatrists agree on exactly how EST works.171  Some
experts feel that its occasional effectiveness is due to its physiolo-
logical effect on the body.172  Others argue that EST may work
because of its psychological effect on patients. 1 3 One interesting
theory is that EST works, when it does, because of a "placebo"
effect on the patient; that is, the patient's "thinking" he will be
aided by EST helps to relieve the symptoms of his disorder.
74
disorders are typically characterized by insomnia and digestive disturbances. Re-
search indicates that these disorders do not- respond well to EST. Krouner, supra
note 10, at 401 n.96.
171. SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 408.
172. One of the first physiological theories was advanced by Dr. M. Sakel, who
thought that one characteristic of schizophrenia was hyperactive nerve cells which
tended to overrespond to normal stimuli. The theory was that this hyperactivity
could be traced to the presence of some excitant hormone. Insulin, according to
Sakel's theory, somehow neutralized the troublesome hormone, and insulin shock
acted to protect nerve cells in the subcortical centers of the brain from the harm-
ful effects of the excitant hormone. Krouner, supra note 10, at 400.
Sakel's theory was criticized because it did not adequately explain how the
"excitant hormone" (which Sakel was never able to isolate) induced hyperactive
nerve cells in schizophrenics, and because there was no explanation of how insulin
protected the sub-cortical nerve cells. Krouner, supra note 10, at 400.
Dr. von Meduna theorized that his metrazol shock treatments were successful
because of a basic antagonism between schizophrenia and epilepsy. This antago-
nism forced symptoms of schizophrenia to subside after the shock treatment.
Sakel and von Meduna's theories have been discredited with subsequent research,
but there still exists no accepted explanation of how EST works, if in fact it does.
Id. Hoch, Clinical and Biological Interrelations Between Schizophrenia and
Epilepsy, 99 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 507 (1943).
173. Some of the psychological explanations for the occasional success of
shock treatment include: (1) a theory that the retrograde amnesia induced by
EST helps the patient analyze problems more effectively (Furlong, The Mythology
of Electroconvulsive Therapy, 13 COMP. PSYCI-nAT. 235, 236 (1972)); (2) a the-
ory that undesirable behavior ceases because EST effectively "punishes" the pa-
tient for such behavior (Dies, Electroconvulsive Therapy: A Social Learning
Theory Interpretation, 146 J. MENT. Dis. 334 (1968)); and (3) a theory that EST
works to satisfy certain guilt complexes through punishment being administered
by a "doctor-father" figure. Miller, Psychological Theories of ECT: A Review,
5 INT'L J. PSYCH1AT. 154 (1968).
174. Grimm points out that before EST should be used, several important
factors should be considered:
(1) behavior per se is not connected with EST, in that certain types of depres-
sion are unaffected by convulsions in the patient;
(2) duration of illness is not determinative-long-standing endogenous depres-
sion and short-term acute psychotic depression are equally responsive to
EST; and
(3) since epileptics can still suffer depression after EST, the convulsion itself
may not be the determinative factor in EST's effectiveness.
Grimm concludes that after thirty-five years with no controlled studies to dis-
tinguish EST effects from the effects of factors like anesthesia, shock and anes-
thesia combined, psychological responses to anesthesia, fear of transient deperson-
alization after treatment, or the possible "placebo" effect (that is, studies in which
patients were successfully treated by a shock treatment device which did every-
thing but actually pass current), it is impossible to ascertain whether and how
EST itself really works. Grimm, supra note 143, at 5-6.
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This brief discussion of shock treatment illustrates that it is
a potentially dangerous procedure, which may or may not be effec-
tive in treating certain forms of mental illness. Hopefully, as the
research on shock treatment continues, scientists will be able to
provide more information on how this peculiar treatment works
and when, if ever, it should be used.
V. INFORMED CONSENT AND AB 4481
A. Background
An early position on the issue of informed consent to shock
treatment is found in an advisory opinion by the Pensylvania De-
partment of Justice, entitled Shock Therapy in State Hospitals.
The Department concluded that mental patients have no right to
consent because the
care, treatment, and maintenance of mental patients is a gov-
ernment function . . . best carried out by the agencies of
[Pennsylvania] uncontrolled by the dictates of the patient,
his friends, relatives or others . . . . [T]he superintendents
of state mental hospitals, in their sound discretion may admin-
ister to patients of state mental hospitals, electric shocks and
such other treatments, which, in the exercise of reasonable
skill and judgment, are indicated, after observation and diag-
nosis, as being necessary and proper for the patient's best wel-
fare, without first obtaining written permission for such treat-
ment from such patients, their friends, relatives, guardians or
other persons who may be legally entitled to give such con-
sent on behalf of such patients. . . . While such consent may
be desirable in some cases, it is not essential under the laws
of this commonwealth.1
7 5
175. 64 PA. D. & C. 14, 35 (1948). This unenlightened approach to the rights
of mental patients harkens back to the medieval era when the mentally ill were
classified as "idiots" and "lunatics." It was thought that the mentally disturbed
person was possessed by the devil and totally incapable of independent thought
or judgment. The King was given ultimate responsibility for "idiots" and the his-
tory of barbaric treatment inflicted on the mentally ill by the King's custodians
is a tragic one. See generally S. BRAKEL & R. RoCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 2-8 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BRAKEL & RocK].
The Pennsylvania Department of Justice's rationale for contending that hos-
pitals did not need to obtain informed consent from shock treatment patients was
that "[aln insane person has no constitutional or statutory rights of liberty in
the ordinary and conventional sense of the term." 64 PA. D. & C. 14, 27. Wilson
v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1964), is a good example of how courts tradi-
tionally applied the Pennsylvania Department of Justice approach to the rights of
mental patients. In Wilson, plaintiff had undergone repeated EST for severe de-
pression. She brought suit on a negligence theory alleging permanent brain dam-
age. Id. at 479. The Kentucky Court of Appeals sustained a lower court's di-
rected verdict for the defendant. The court held that the plaintiff was presumed
to have agreed to the EST because (1) she "voluntarily" submitted to it, and (2)
plaintiff's husband did not try to stop the EST treatments even though he knew
they were being administered. Id. at 480. For an interesting discussion of the
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The opinion illustrates the archaic assumptions that mental
illness denotes mental incompetence, and that a mental patient
does not deserve the same consideration that other persons receiv-
ig dangerous medical treatment are accorded. Fortunately,
courts and legislatures now recognize that patients in mental insti-
tutions are not presumed to be incompetent, 176 and that the same
requirement of informed consent for other medical treatment
should apply to mental patients receiving psychosurgery or shock
treatment.77
B. Capacity to Consent
AB 4481 is significant because it recognizes a patient's right
to refuse psychosurgery or shock treatment, as long as he or she
Wilson case, see Morse, Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 16 BUFFALO L. REV.
649 (1967). Further discussion of the rights of mental patients is contained in
Note, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill: Due Process and Equal Protection, 35
BROOKLYN L. REV. 187 (1969). An excellent discussion of modem California
law and the rights of the mentally ill is found in Comment, Limitations onl Indi-
vidual Rights in California Incompetency Proceeding, 7 U.C.D.L. REV. 457
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment]. Finally, for a fascinating analysis of
how eighth amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" attacks can be used to
protect the rights of the mentally ill, see THE MENTAL HEALTH PROJECT, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 739-42 (1973).
176. See Comment, supra note 175, at 457.
Many mental health statutes provide that a mental patient is to be considered
legally competent until a formal adjudication of incompetency is undertaken. See
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.070(1) (1971); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-564(a) (1973);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2933 (Cum. Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 51
(1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 25 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253 A. 18.1 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-24.2 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. MENTAL
HYGENE LAW § 29.03 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-55.3(c)
(1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.375(i)(c) (1971); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5547-83(b) (Supp. 1973).
Modern psychiatry also recognizes that mental illness does not necessarily af-
fect decision-making capacity or reasoning ability. See, e.g., COMMI TEE ON No-
MENCLATURE AND STATISTICS-AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISEASES 38-41 (2d ed. 1968); J. PAGE, PSY-
CHOPATHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING DEVIANCE 32-35 (1971 ).
The following commentators argue that relatively few committed mental pa-
tients are incapable of deciding whether or not to seek treatment. Dershowitz,
Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL, Feb.-
Mar. 1968, at 32; and Siegal, The Justifications for Medical Commitment-Real
or Illusory, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 21, 31-33 (1969).
177. The need for a patient's informed consent to shock treatment is recog-
nized by the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation. Krouner, supra note 10, at 406. Despite this recognition, it is interesting
to note the reaction of the chairman of the psychiatric committee at a large San
Francisco hospital to AB 4481:
Electric shock therapy is a valid treatment modality and in many cases
the only form of treatment available. It is deplorable that a small group
of ill-informed fanatics appear to have influenced Assemblyman Vascon-
cellos to sponsoring AB 4481.
Trapnell letter, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
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is capable of giving informed consent."' 8 On the crucial question
of capacity to consent, the new law breaks with the rest of Cali-
fornia law which has traditionally vested this type of determination
in the superior court, and places it instead with a review committee
composed of physicians. 179
The review committee is required to make the determination
of capacity to consent when considering whether to allow a patient
to undergo psychosurgery.' s0 If the committee determines the
patient cannot give an informed consent, then the psychosurgery
may not proceed.' However, the law's shock treatment provi-
sions are quite different. The review committee can authorize
the shock treatment over a patient's objections if the committee
determines that the shock treatment is necessary.'8 2 Because of
the serious risks a person is exposed to when contemplating
psychosurgery or shock treatment, the issue of capacity to consent
should be determined in the same manner as that used to deter-
mine mental capacity during a commitment or guardianship pro-
ceeding conducted by a court.
The law presently requires the superior court to determine
a patient's mental status when considering commitment or appoint-
ment of a guardian to manage the patient's affairs.' 8  This
178. Cal. Stats. (1974), ch. 1534, at 4328.
179. The review committee, which can authorize shock treatment on an unwill-
ing patient who is deemed incapable of rendering informed consent, is composed
of three physicians. One physician is to be appointed by the mental facility and
the other two by the local mental health director. The law further requires that
at least two of the physicians be Board-certified psychiatrists or neurosurgeons.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5326.3(e), 5326.4(e) (West Supp. 1975). But
see text accompanying note 202 infra.
180. Id. § 5326.3(e).
181. Id. § 5326.3(b).
182. Id. § 5326.4(f). But see text accompanying note 202 infra.
183. In California, the power to determine the issue of mental incompetence
is vested solely in the superior court. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West Supp.
1975). The jurisdiction of the court is bifurcated-one level of jurisdiction ceas-
ing when competence or incompetence is adjudicated, the second jurisdictional
function continuing during guardianship or conservatorship, if the individual is
found to be incompetent. Browne v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 593, 107 P.2d
1 (1940).
The state traditionally assumes a parens patriae role in dealing with minors
or the mentally incompetent. This means the state views itself as the protector
and guardian of persons under disability to insure that the rights of the minor
or incompetent are not abused. Comment, supra note 175, at 460. A minor's
status is determined solely by age; mental incompetence is statutorily defined in
California,
to mean or refer to any person, whether insane or not, why by reason
of old age, disease, weakness of mind, or other cause, is unable, unas-
sisted, properly to manage and take care of himself or his property, and
by reason thereof is likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or
designing persons.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 1460 (West Supp. 1975).
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method is altogether appropriate when one considers that commit-
ment or appointment of a guardian involves the deprivation of a
person's freedom and his right to make basic decisions affecting
his life.' Constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection have been held applicable to these types of hearings.' 85
There is no reason why the determination of a person's capacity
to consent to dangerous and irreversible forms of medical treat-
ment should be regarded as any less deserving of the procedural
safeguards that attach in a commitment or guardianship proceed-
ing.180 It has been observed that brain surgery is probably the
most fearsome type of operation-"the invasion of cold steel of
man's citadel of reason."' 8 7  Shock treatment, especially if fre-
quently administered, has the equally "fearsome" potential of
affecting one's "citadel of reason." Yet, despite the serious nature
of psychosurgery and shock treatment, the California Legislature
has enacted a law which does not allow a court to determine
capacity to consent to these treatments. This transfer of power
to determine capacity to consent is without precedent to California
law, which up to now has clearly required judicial preeminence
in the determination of mental capacity.' 88
AB 448 I's ban on psychosurgery when a patient is consid-
ered incapable of informed consent is undermined by vesting the
crucial determination of that capacity in a committee of doctors
rather than a court. Capacity to consent, and thereby to exercise
a legal right, like any other question of mental capacity, is pri-
marily a legal issue. 8 9 Medical opinion may be helpful in under-
184. Two consequences flow from a determination of mental incompetency.
First, the individual is precluded from exercising certain rights such as the right
to contract or engage in certain professions. Second, after a guardianship is estab-
lished, the guardian is given legal authority to act as an officer of the court to
perform certain functions for the mental incompetent. Comment, supra note 175,
at 460-61.
185. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Baxtrom v. Herald,
383 U.S. 107 (1966); Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 666, 673, 464 P.2d 56,
61, 83 Cal. Rptr. 600, 605 (1970).
186. The state of Washington has recently enacted legislation which requires
a hospital to obtain a court order permitting EST on a patient who objects to the
treatment. Before the court order is issued the patient has a right to a hearing
where he may be represented by counsel and where he can have court-appointed
psychiatrists testify on his behalf. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.370(7)
(Supp. 1974). The statute provides that its procedures can be dispensed with in
an emergency, where delay may be fatal to the patient. Id.
The statute strikes a reasonable balance between competing interests, that is,
the right of a mental patient to refuse treatment versus the right of the mental
institution to treat patients in a manner it deems necessary. It also helps guaran-
tee that EST will not be resorted to unless other less dangerous forms of treatment
fail.
187. SLOVENKO, supra note 7, at 247.
188. See note 183 supra.
189. See Comment, supra note 175, for a thorough analysis of the legal ration-
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standing mental competency, but doctors are not trained to make
a determination of whether a person should be deprived of basic
legal rights. 9 '
When an institution is considering whether or not to per-
form psychosurgery, the consent of the patient is imperative.
Equally essential is the patient's capacity to consent. If the law
is prepared to allow mental patients to undergo psychosurgery at
all, it should strictly insure, through a judicial determination, that
a patient has the capacity to consent. Kaimowitz illustrates how
the coercive atmosphere of a mental institution can deprive a pa-
tient of the opportunity freely to consent to psychosurgery with
full knowledge of the consequences.' The case also demonstrates
that there is no substitute for a determination of the capacity to
consent to such treatment. 92
AB 4481's supposed "protection" of a mental patient's right
to refuse shock treatment is illusory. As the law presently stands,
shock treatment can be administered over a patient's objections
upon determination by a review committee of his inability to con-
sent. 9' The law thereby creates an unacceptable possibility of
abuse. Outside of a courtroom there is no guarantee that a pa-
tient's due process rights will be observed, and AB 4481 provides
absolutely no guidelines as to the appropriate procedure for de-
termining capacity to consent.19 4  Due process safeguards such as
ale for incompetency proceedings.
190. Commentators have been critical of California law because it relies too
heavily on medical opinion in the adjudication of what is basically a legal ques-
tion. Comment, supra note 175, at 476. The dangers of overemphasis on medi-
cal opinion in areas involving moral values is thoughtfully analyzed in T.
SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963).
The California Supreme Court, in In re Waite, reversed a lower court deter-
mination of mental competency on several grounds, including over-reliance on
"expert" medical testimony used by the petitioner to prove incompetence. 14 Cal.
2d 727, 731, 97 P.2d 238, 240 (1939).
The court concluded that:
[t]he opinions of the doctors as to [appellant's] "lack of judgment" and
"intelligence defect" are to be tested by a consideration of the facts from
which those opinions are derived; and if those facts do not justify the
conclusions, the opinions are arbitrary, and without substantial value as
evidence.
Id.
191. See text accompanying notes 86-120 supra.
192. Id.
193. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326.4(f) (West Supp. 1975). But see
text accompanying note 202 infra.
194. Another problem with AB 4481 is that it fails to define what standards
are to be applied by the review committee in determining whether a patient is
capable of rendering informed consent. Assemblyman Vasconcellos has proposed
the following guideline:
A person confined shall be deemed incapable of informed consent if such
person cannot understand, or knowingly and intelligently act upon the
information specified in . . . the informed consent provisions of AB
4481.
[Vol. 15
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notice, right to counsel, or right to call witnesses are not provided
for in AB 4481.
The new law fails to recognize that determination of capacity
to consent is the equivalent of a determination of mental com-
petency; as such, the law needs revision to return the capacity to
consent determination to the courts where it belongs.
C. Third Party Consent
Another troublesome feature of AB 4481 is the role the
statute assigns to the guardians or relatives of a minor or legally
adjudged mental incompetent in the informed consent determina-
tion. Section 5326.4(c) of the bill permits shock treatment to be
performed only after certain conditions have been satisfied.1"5
The condition relating to parents or guardians states that shock
treatment shall be performed only after "a responsible relative or
the guardian or conservator" is given an "oral explanation" of the
risks and benefits associated with shock treatment.'96 AB 4481
provides that shock treatment can be administered as long as three
conditions are met:
(1) the relative or guardian is given an oral explanation of
the treatment;
(2) adequate documentation of the need for the treatment
is entered into the patient's record; and
(3) the review committee unanimously approves the pro-
posed procedure. 197
The new law does not require that the treating physician ob-
tain consent of a relative or guardian. It requires only that an
"oral explanation" of the procedure be given."' If the statute
§ 5326.3(c) of Amendments, supra note 26, at 3.
Assuming, arguendo, that the reviewing committee has legal authority to find
a patient incapable of giving consent to shock treatment, it is essential that the
law provide careful guidance on what criteria are to be used in this determination.
Since the question of capacity to consent involves a patient's ability to consider
factors relating to the risks and benefits of the treatment, the capacity standard
should focus on a patient's decision-making ability. One proposed standard is
contained in the National Institute of Mental Health's Draft Act Governing Hos-
pitalization of the Mentally Ill, reprinted in BRAKEL & RocK, supra note 175, at
469.
The Draft Act states that a patient lacks capacity to consent when, as a result
of mental illness, he loses the "power to make choices or becomes so confused
. . . that he cannot make a decision having any relation to the factors bearing
on his hospitalization." Id. A lucid analysis of the problems inherent in develop-
ing a workable standard of capacity to consent is contained in Developments in
the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il1, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1216-
22 (1974).
195. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5326.4(a)-(g) (West Supp. 1975).
196. Id. § 5326.4(c).
197. Id. § 5326.4(c)-(e).
198. Id. § 5326.4(c).
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means what it says, then the universally recognized right of rela-
tives or guardians to withhold consent, in all but the most extreme
circumstances, has been abrogated. This provision of AB 4481
would allow the physician to proceed with the shock treatment,
not only against the wishes of the patient considered incapable of
consent, but also against the wishes of the parent, relative, or
guardian. 199 To deny a close relative or guardian the exclusive
right to make decisions affecting the well being of his or her child
or ward constitutes a gross infringement of the rights of a mental
patient.
VII. CONCLUSION
California has made great strides forward in insuring that the
legal and civil rights of mental patients are protected. It is no
secret that mental health legislation in this state has been a model
for other states presently engaged in updating and modernizing
their mental health laws. AB 4481 should be viewed as a further
step in California's continuing effort to protect mental patients
from being denied basic civil rights.
Unfortunately, the bill is far from perfect, with serious prob-
lems remaining to be solved. Because of the inherent coercion of the
mental institution, the bill's provisions dealing with the ability of
a long-term involuntary detainee to render informed consent for
psychosurgery should be reexamined. Equally questionable are
the provisions of AB 4481 that allow a mental patient to be sub-
jected to shock treatment against his or her wishes if a review
committee determines that the patient does not have the capacity
to give informed consent. There is nothing objectionable in allow-
ing a committee of doctors to determine the medical advisability of
psychosurgery or shock treatment for a given patient. But the
determination of a patient's capacity to give informed consent is
a legal decision that belongs with a court, not with a medical review
committee. Finally, the provisions of the bill which allow shock
treatment to be administered to a minor or a mental incompetent
without a parent's or a guardian's consent need to be amended
explicitly to require such consent.
199. The list of proposed amendments to AB 4481 prepared by Assemblyman
Vasconcellos's office is ambiguous on this point. On pages 5-6 of the proposed
revisions, section 5326.7(f) states that if the patient is incapable of giving in-
formed consent, then written informed consent is to be obtained, pursuant to sec-
tions 5326.3 and 5326.4. However, the suggested sections 5326.3 and 5326.4 re-
tain the same provisions as the present law. Under the proposed revisions, con-
sent would be required only for psychosurgery. With respect to EST, the old law
and new proposals require only that the parent or guardian be given "the oral
explanation" of the procedure. Nothing is said about obtaining actual consent.
Amendments, supra note 26, at 5-6.
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AB 4481 faces serious judicial and legislative challenges in
the near future. The bill is being attacked by doctors in court as
an unconstitutional invasion of the doctor-patient relationship.200
Amendments are being considered in the state legislature to modify
the stringent penalty provisions and to clarify some of the confu-
sion which presently surrounds the bill.20' One such amend-
ment is contained in a bill presently moving through the state
legislature. The bill will amend AB 4481 to provide for a judi-
cial determination of capacity to consent before shock treatment
is administered to an involuntarily detained patient.202  This type
of amendment is urgently needed because the issue of capacity
to consent, like mental competency, is primarily a legal one which
should be left for a court to decide. Until the law recognizes this
crucial point, serious questions remain as to how effective AB
4481 will be in truly protecting a mental patient's right to refuse
psychosurgery and shock treatment.
Zachary E. Zwerdling
200. See note 16 supra.
201. See notes 26 & 32 supra.
202. The new bill, AB 1032, was introduced by Assemblyman Vasconcellos on
March 4, 1975. As of this writing, AB 1032 has passed the state assembly and
is on its way to consideration by the senate.
AB 1032 requires that a three-doctor review committee give unanimous con-
sent to the proposed shock treatment. In addition, the patient's attorney or a rep-
resentative from the Public Defender's office must agree that the involuntarily de-
tained patient has the capacity to give written informed consent.
The bill requires a court hearing on the patient's capacity to consent, if in
the judgment of the attending physician or the attorney representing the patient,
the patient lacks such capacity. If the patient does not have the necessary ca-
pacity, the bill authorizes specified relatives or a guardian to consent in his place.
AB 1032 further provides that in the case of voluntarily admitted patients,
a physician other than the attending physician must verify the patient's capacity
to give informed consent.
The bill does not affect AB 4481's psychosurgery provisions.
